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For many natural hazards, design codes include simple approaches, based on semi-
probabilistic methods, which allow the engineer to check the structural safety of the
construction. This framework implements the socio-economic optimization of the re-
sources to be used to build construction works. At present no simple approaches have
been formulated for snow avalanche hazard. Recent research focuses on fully probabilis-
tic assessment of structural safety, aimed at the estimation of the failure probability
of the element at risk. This strategy requires a large amount of data and complex
simulation techniques. In order to propose the implementation of snow avalanche haz-
ard into the framework of modern design codes, we suggest an approach based on
different avalanche scenarios with different snowfall return periods depending on the
consequences of failure of the designed construction.
1 Introduction
Any structure, or structural element, should be designed in such a way that it is suited for the
use during its design working life. In other words, it has to adequately resist the expected ac-
tions, to withstand extreme actions, and not to be damaged by extreme natural events in a way
disproportionate to the original cause [1]. These are the basic principles of a reliability-based struc-
tural design [2, 3, 4, 5]. Standards, like Eurocode, ASCE rules, as well as National Prescriptions,
have implemented these principles in such a way that, nowadays, the design of a structure follows
a probabilistic framework, rather than a deterministic one. For example, wind speed has been
measured during a given period, and a characteristic value corresponding to a given exceedance
probability has been assigned to each site [6].
Actions are divided into three classes: permanent (acting continuously, i.e., dead loads), variable
(for which the variation of magnitude in time is small if compared to the mean value, i.e., wind
loads), and accidental (actions unlikely to occur with a significant magnitude during the life of
the construction). A natural phenomenon is classified either as a variable or accidental load,
depending on site conditions. For example, in the majority of European countries, high speed
winds are considered as extreme meteorological events, thus accidental actions. On the contrary,
in US tornado-prone areas, cyclones are regarded as variable actions [1]. Similarly, earthquakes
have been extensively studied and are considered as variable actions. For each site, a ground motion
intensity is related to the probability of occurrence of the natural event and, thus, a probabilistic
approach to the design of the construction is possible.
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In general, risk analysis considers the probability of a structure to be damaged one or more
times in a given number of years, `, by a natural hazard having a known return period. If the
hazardous events are independent between the years the probability of occurrence of an event, Pe,
with a magnitude m larger than a reference valueM , i.e., Pe = p (m ≥M), is related to the return
period (measured in years) of the threshold event, T , by the following expression [7, 8]
Pe = p (m ≥M) = 1−
(
1− 1
T
)`
. (1)
The previous expression is the probability of at least one occurrence, i.e., one minus the probability
of no occurrences. At present, the loads generated by snow avalanches are considered as accidental,
independent of the geographical region in which the structure is built. Different return periods
events should be considered depending on the use of the construction in order to make the reliability
differentiation possible. In its most general definition, the reliability is the ability of an item to
perform a required function under stated conditions for a specified period of time. The reliability
differentiation is the set of measures intended for the socio-economic optimization of the resources
to be used to build construction works, taking into account all the expected consequences of failures
and the cost of the construction works [9].
In the framework of the current methods for assessing structural safety, reliability evaluation
can be performed at different levels of accuracy and complexity. Fully probabilistic approaches,
leading to the calculation of the probability of failure for a given structure under certain actions,
amount to multi-dimensional integration in the space of certain random variables describing the
statistics of actions and strengths (e.g. [9], Annex C). These methods require a deep knowledge
of the statistics of both actions and material properties, which are usually unavailable to the
structural engineer involved in the design of an ordinary construction. To overcome this lack of
knowledge, regulations and building codes are based on the so called semi-probabilistic method,
which introduces characteristic values of both actions and material properties and partial safety
coefficients. In this framework, the structural safety is checked through simple inequalities; i.e.,
for each structural member, the resistance must be larger than the force resulting from the applied
external loads.
The aim of this paper is to propose a first step towards the implementation of a semi-probabilistic
procedure for checking the safety of constructions impacted by snow avalanches, following ap-
proaches common to other natural hazards.
In what follows, the current practice for evaluating design loads in presence of natural hazards
is summarized (Section 2), with regard to areas affected by snow avalanches. The proposed strat-
egy for reliability differentiation in snow avalanche design is then described (Section 3) and the
introduced improvements discussed (Section 4).
2 Reliability-based analysis and importance factors
From the point of view of structural safety, buildings and other constructions should be classified on
the basis of the risk to human life, health, and welfare associated with their damage or failure, and
by the nature of their occupancy or use [10]. Thus, major care has to be paid to those constructions
in which the number of occupants and their exposure are higher (greater is the exposure, higher
is the risk). As a design principle, design rules foster reliability differentiation: taking as example
seismic excitation, a temporarily occupied construction should be designed to resist events with
lower return period, i.e., lower intensity, than the one related to permanently occupied buildings.
As a result of the previous consideration, design codes identity different consequences of failure or
malfunction of a structure related both to the loss of life and to economic, social or environmental
consequences. Table 1 illustrates the consequence classes which relate to the occupancy of the
building [9]. In seismic design, the previously mentioned classification turns into the importance
of the activity performed in the building [11]. That is, constructions devoted to public safety
and hospitals, in case of earthquake, and despite their size, have higher importance than ordinary
2
structures (houses, hotels) even if highly occupied (see Table 2). Infrastructures, such as roads and
railways, are classified similarly.
For any structure (or infrastructure) subjected to a natural hazard, the reliability, R, can be
calculated as
R = S −A (2)
where S and A are the variables expressing the resistance and the action, respectively. Considering
that both the variables are expressed through probability functions, R would be probability-based
[13, 14]. In this sense, R can be negative. Structural safety requires that the probability of having
R < 0 must be kept lower than an annual threshold value. Depending on the type of structure
and the characteristics of the considered failure mode the threshold value varies between 10−3 and
10−6 per year. In the most common situations the following inequality should hold [15, 16, 17]:
Pr (R < 0) < 10−5 per year. (3)
Clearly, since reliability requirements can be different for different limit states to be considered,
e.g., serviceability is less stringent than structural failure, the threshold value differs from case to
case.
The principle of reliability differentiation is achieved by varying load intensity. For example, the
increment (or decrement) of load magnitude can be achieved by multiplying the design load by a
factor, γI , usually greater than one (e.g., seismic analysis in ASCE 7 [10, Ch.1] and in EN 1998
[11]). The reference peak ground acceleration, agR corresponds to the reference return period of
the seismic action for the no-collapse requirement (2450 years). The design ground acceleration on
outcropping bedrock, ag, is equal to
ag = γIagR. (4)
where γI is the importance factor related to the consequences of a structural failure. For CC2a
constructions, γI = 1.0. This strategy is not exclusive to seismic design. For example, static snow
load is the result of the product of ground snow load and an importance factor depending on the
occupancy of the building [10, Ch. 7].
A different approach is proposed by the Italian seismic rules [18], where new terms to describe
seismic hazards and seismic actions on structures were introduced to associate to each conse-
quence/importance class a design reference event with a different return period [19]. The impor-
tance of the construction affects the final value of the ground acceleration through its reference
life [18]. The probability of occurrence of the earthquake, which can be described by means of
an extreme-values distribution, obviously depends on the length of the period during which the
construction is in use, i.e., the design working life of the structure, LD (see Table 3). The more
important the construction, the longer its reference life, LR, is. In other words, the design working
life is corrected (either increased or decreased) by a multiplying factor, CU , the coefficient of use,
in order to consider the importance of the building, i.e.,
LR = LDCU . (5)
Defining the reference life as the period during which a structure can be experience an event with
magnitude m greater than a reference one, M , Eqn.(1) turns into
Pe = p (m ≥M) = 1−
(
1− 1
T
)LR
. (6)
For example, in a reference period of 50 years (LR = 50), the probability of occurrence of events
having magnitude larger than an event with return period T = 475 years, is Pe = 10%. This is the
requirement for the Ultimate Limit State (ULS) invoked in European prescriptions [18, 11].
Usually, the target probabilities, which depends on cost and benefits analysis, are given by design
rules. European and American guidelines give the performance objectives and identify the design
events with the respective occurrence probabilities. In EC 8, Pe equal to 10% and 2% in 50 years
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refer to Damage Limitation State and Collapse Limit State, respectively [20]. In FEMA 356 [21],
a 4 x 4 performance matrix is illustrated. Its rows relate to seismic events with a given probability
of occurrence, while the columns refer to target performance levels. The Basic Safety Objective
includes the same seismic excitations as the European prescriptions. In addition, enhanced (or
limited) rehabilitation objectives provide higher (or lower) performance levels for given seismic
hazard levels.
3 Snow avalanche impact design
In the same way as tornados in specific coastal areas of the US, one might assume the impact of
snow as variable action. Since this natural hazard is common in alpine environment, it would be
adequate to consider various performance levels (similar to seismic ones) for the interaction between
structures and snow flow. The reference events should take into account both the occupancy and
the importance of the construction, as described in the previous section. The approach herein
described implements the reliability concepts suggested by EC 0 [9].
The occupancy of buildings in mountain areas is highly variable. Mountain resorts are full of
people in winter season. On the other hand, mountain agricultural constructions are exclusively
occupied in summer, when avalanche hazard is null. In this sense, serviceability standards have to
be fulfilled instead of requirements for people safety. The previous consideration would necessarily
implies a design oriented towards the reduction of construction costs, as fostered in the rules [9].
3.1 Current practice
Norwegian regulations state that new houses should not be built where avalanches fall more fre-
quently than once every 1000 years [22]. Icelandic studies showed that different return periods
compete to different risk for the constructions [23]. Swiss regulations related to the design and
construction of buildings in snow avalanche hazardous areas act in two complementary ways. First,
land planning is considered [24].
The Swiss procedure provides mapping criteria for dense-snow avalanches depending on impact
pressures over return periods of 30 and 300 years. If the impact pressure is larger than 30 kPa,
no construction work is allowed (neither the construction of building occupied only in summer).
If the impact pressure is smaller than 30 kPa, the structure has to resist the forces caused by the
interaction between flow and construction. The impact pressures estimated for both the previous
cases are calculated for a snow depth in the avalanche release zone assumed to coincide with the
snow depth precipitation in 3 days before the event, or 3-day snowfall depth, H72 [25, 24]. The
choice of three successive days snowfall is due to the fact the damages are often caused by heavy
snowfall over several days rather than a huge one-day snowfall [26, 27]. In [28], a comparison
between different forecast variables, say new snow in a single day, in 3, 5 or 10 days, is presented.
The new snow in three days seems the most appropriate for forecasting large and infrequent
avalanches. Meanwhile, from the analysis of a database of avalanches along a single path in French
Alps it results a weak correlation between the release probability and 3-day snowfall depth because
major avalanches can be released after snowfalls that were not necessarily intense but sustained
over several days [29]. The numerical simulations illustrated in [30] show that, given a snow depth,
a change in friction coefficients implies a wide range of impact pressures.
Despite the previous considerations, a procedure that considers 3-day snowfall depth is currently
applied in Italy [31] and in France. Avalanche hazard mapping based on these criteria requires
as input the evaluation of H72 for T = 30 and T = 300, at least [32, 33]. Although the return
periods are different, Jónasson and others [23] stated that Norwegian and Swiss reference events
are roughly comparably to a return period of a thousand years Besides, there are area outside
western Europe where neither weather records nor weather models are adequate to estimate H72
for planning purposes.
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Besides land planning, the structure must be designed to resist an impact force due to a H72
release snow depth with return period equal to 300 years. At present, since 300 years return
period is used independently from the use and the occupancy of the construction, regulations do
not implement entirely the previous considerations on reliability differentiation.
The research conducted in the last decade focused on the development of an individual risk
framework for snow avalanche hazard. The estimation of the individual risk due to snow avalanche
hazard in densely populated areas is currently practiced in Iceland [34]. It was found that the
average annual risk due to snow avalanches for people living in hazardous areas was five times
higher than the risk due to traffic accident. The risk within the most endangered areas was much
higher and thus unacceptable by any measure. Hence, a framework for the evaluation of the
individual risk was developed [35] supporting the thesis that the reduction of the individual risk
would reduce the aggregated risk to the society.
In 2010, Bertrand et al. [36] deterministically quantified the vulnerability of a simple reinforced
concrete building (made by two orthogonal walls) considering the geometry and the percentage
of steel reinforcement. Eckert et al. [37] used the results of [36] and presented a relationship
between reliability-based failure probabilities and individual risks. In addition, they shown that
the difference between vulnerability and fragility curves is not that important when they are used
within a risk framework. Following that, Favier et al. [38] obtained a set of fragility curves for
reinforced concrete walls exposed to a uniform and quasi-static snow avalanche pressure load.
They accounted for different limit states: depending on the safety of people and the real collapse,
they found different risk thresholds for the assessment of the structure. In their considerations,
the winter usage of each building was accounted for. Focusing on individual risk, they showed
that the usual tricentennial return period for the reference event may be seen as optimistic; in
their calculations based on a set of various buildings, only events with return period larger than a
thousand year are below standard risk acceptance levels [39].
3.2 Proposed practice
It must be mentioned that meteorological databases are the only continuous source of data related
to avalanche [26]. In some cases, a record of the run-out distances of past avalanches is avail-
able; exceptionally, it is possible to have an estimation of the volume of snow involved, velocities,
impact pressures from back-analysis on constructions or forests [40, 41]. Anyway, it is possible
to numerically estimate the parameters of dynamic models of snow avalanche motion that fit the
observations in the run-out zone, given the release volume through the statistics of meteorological
records [42].
Following the approach illustrated in Section 2, a design strategy able to account for reliability
differentiation is proposed. The use of different scenarios accounting for different snow depth is
fundamental to the proposed design approach. Once this parameter is defined, the expert on snow
engineering would perform numerical simulations, which consider both the topography and the
roughness of the site, the presence of vegetation and the dynamical parameters, and would give an
estimation of the impact pressure on the building. The effects of the impact are then evaluated
through common procedures, according to the personal choices of the structural designer about
methods of analysis and construction materials [40]. This approach follows the typical design
flowchart for structures subjected to natural hazards and anthropic loads.
According to the current practice, an additional coefficient is introduced into Eqn.(5), which is
rewritten as
LR = LDCICA, (7)
where CA is a reducing coefficient. The purpose of this coefficient is illustrated in the following.
The performance objectives invoked by the American and European rules for seismic design
[21, 11] and converted for avalanche hazard design are four:
• Operativity limit state (OLS): the event does not cause damage to the structure nor interrup-
tions of the activities. The probability of exceedance of avalanche action during the reference
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life of the construction, Pe, is set equal to 50% [11];
• Limit state of prompt use or Damage limitation (DLS): the event causes slight damages that
does not compromise the stiffness and the whole capacity of the structure. The activity has to
be temporarily suspended since the apparatuses might be subjected to malfunctioning. The
probability of exceedance of avalanche action during the reference life of the construction,
Pe, is set equal to 20% [11];
• Limit state for the safeguard of human life or Ultimate state (ULS): after avalanche impact,
the construction is affected by failures and collapses of nonstructural components. The
construction retains significant stiffness and resistance against vertical actions and moderate
resistance to horizontal actions. The activity has to be interrupted in order to make large
rehabilitation works of the apparatuses. The probability of exceedance of avalanche action
during the reference life of the construction, Pe, is set equal to 10% [11];
• Limit state for collapse prevention (CLS): after the impact event, the construction has suf-
fered serious failures and collapses of nonstructural components. The construction retains
a significant stiffness and resistance against vertical actions but has a small safety margin
against collapse from horizontal actions. Large structural works are needed in order to fulfill
safety requirements. The activity has to be suspended. The probability of exceedance of
avalanche action during the reference life of the construction, Pe, is set equal to 2% [11].
In the present framework, the current design procedure could be interpreted as follows. We
assume that the construction referred to in the Swiss standards [33] has a design working life, LW ,
equal to 50 years and an importance factor, CI , equal to 1.0, and it has to be designed to resist
an event with return period T equal to 300 years. The previous statement implies that at the
Ultimate Limit State, for which the probability of exceedance, Pe, in the reference life represented
by Eqn.(7), is equal to 10%. Therefore, Eqn.(6) can be written as
0.10 = 1−
(
1− 1
300
)50×1.00×CA
. (8)
The previous equality is satisfied for CA = 0.63.
Reliability differentiation is obtained by assigning to the coefficient of importance the values
reported in Table 4. The American rule [10] suggests multiplicative coefficients for snow loads
that have to be applied to the load, not to its return period. At present, no straightforward links
between return period and H72 snow depth exist. That is why we propose to use the importance
factors of Italian seismic rule [18], which operates directly on return periods.
Table 5 reports the return periods of the threshold events for the design of structures in avalanche
hazardous area. The return periods are computed by inverting Eqn.(6) and assigning the prob-
abilities of exceedance previously reported to each limit state. For example, in the design of a
construction, such a private house, in a snow avalanche hazard area, the engineer must design the
structure considering the forces due to an impact of an avalanche that has a 300 years return period
release depth, H72 (obtained in Table 5 at LD = 50 yr, CC2a, ULS). On the contrary, if an hotel
has to be built (at the same site) the reference event has return period equal to 450 years (50 yr,
CC2b, ULS), i.e., larger impact forces are expected. Similarly, in case of an agricultural building,
say a barn, which has design life equal to LD = 30 years, the reference event for estimation of the
impact forces for the design of structures has return period equal to 126 years (30 yr, CC1, ULS).
For the design of the construction, the variable of interest might be represented by the impact
pressure, i.e., the interaction between snow avalanche and construction is represented by dynamic
forces. To get the value of the impact pressure, various procedures are possible, depending on the
amount of data available for the investigated snow avalanche phenomenon.
If little information is available, first the return period of the snow avalanche is determined, e.g.,
using Table 5. Then, the snow depth in the release zone (and, thus, the release volume) is estimated
through statistical models based on meteorological data. Following that, a numerical simulation
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of the snow avalanche phenomenon is required. The values of the friction parameters to be used in
the numerical model depend on the return period, as already done in the current practice [43]. In
the proposed strategy, the values corresponding to the chosen return period should be used, and
the impact pressures at the construction site are estimated from the numerical model.
If the avalanche path was previously studied and a return period was assigned to a run-out
distance, the friction parameters along the path could be determined in such a way that the
numerical simulation fits the observations. In this case, the release volume is still determined with
the statistical models based on meteorological data for a given return period. As in the previous
case, the impact pressures at the construction site are estimated numerically.
After the evaluation of the impact pressure, the structural engineer will use the most appropriate
design choice of materials (concrete, steel, masonry, timber, or a combination) and structural shapes
(e.g., frame, wall, slab on columns, trusses), according to the magnitude of the impact pressure
and the architectural desiderata. Different impact pressures, referring to different return periods,
would presuppose a different structural design. That is, the design is based on impact pressure,
and not on snow depth in the release zone.
4 Conclusion
The present paper deals with reliability differentiation in the design of structures able to resist snow
avalanche impacts. At present, no reliability differentiation is performed, resulting in oversized
structures, with increased costs for the community.
Following the strategy already used in seismic design rules, the design principle is implemented
through a coefficient of importance that multiplies the design working life of the construction
depending on the degree of occupancy and the relevance of the activities performed herein. In
order to ensure an adequate degree of reliability of the construction against the natural hazard,
current practice indicates as design event that whose magnitude has 10% probability of being
exceeded in the reference life. For ordinary structures with an expected design life of 50 years, this
threshold event has a return period of 475 years, i.e., an annual probability of exceedance equal to
2.1× 10−3.
Nevertheless, the actual design practice in the Alps indicates that the construction has to be
designed for events due to meteorological conditions with return period of 300 years. Inserting
the corresponding annual probability of exceedance in Eqn.(6), without considering any reducing
coefficient, would imply a probability of exceedance of 15.4% in 50 years, that is not acceptable
since grater than the threshold of 10% in 50 years imposted by the Codes. Considering 300 years
as the correct return period for the design of ordinary constructions, a reducing factor is easily
applied to the design working life in order to uniform the probability of exceedance to 10% in
50 years. With the procedure previously described, thanks to the computation of H72 at various
return periods, the reliability differentiation is possible.
Questions are still open. Is the probability of occurrence of a given snow pack thickness linked to
the probability of occurrence of the impact pressure? In other words, there is the possibility that an
avalanche due to a 300 years H72-snow depth has an annual probability of occurrence different from
1/300. In case the annual probability of exceedance was smaller, the design would be conservative.
On the opposite, higher annual probability of exceedance would imply lower structural safety. As
highlighted by Schweizer et al. [28], the average rate of occurrence of a given critical new snow
depth (for which large avalanche are expected) is different from the average rate of occurrence of a
large avalanche event. In addition, with increasing return periods, the ratio of the return periods
of avalanche event and critical snow depth is expected to increase, i.e., even for the very rare and
extreme events the critical new snow depth will often not be extraordinary. Besides that, changing
mountain slope conditions during the design life of the construction has to be considered. In the
past centuries, mountain slopes were used for agriculture and wood exploitation more intensively
than nowadays. That induced large snow avalanches, just because the conditions in the release and
running zone were different, as suggested in [44]. The development of procedures able to consider
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human involvement in snow avalanche hazard are the natural continuation of the studies herein
presented.
The proposed approach is general, i.e., independent of the particular avalanche case, so that
it could be applied to any situation. To this end, a robust correspondence between snow cover
conditions at the release zone and impact pressure on the elements at risk would allow the practical
implementation of the method in design codes. In the future, the knowledge of such a relation-
ship would lead to a simple strategy for the assessment of structural safety of constructions and
infrastructures in mountain hazardous areas.
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Table 1: Categorization of Consequence Classes [12, Table A.1].
Consequence
class
Example of categorization of building type and occupancy
1 (CC1) Single occupancy houses not exceeding 4 storeys. Agricul-
tural buildings. Buildings into which people rarely go, pro-
vided no part of the building is closer to another building,
or area where people do go, than a distance of 1 12 times the
building height.
2a Lower
Risk Group
(CC2a)
5 storey single occupancy houses. Hotels not exceeding 4
storeys. Flats, apartments and other residential buildings
not exceeding 4 storeys. Offices not exceeding 4 storeys.
Industrial buildings not exceeding 3 storeys. Retailing
premises not exceeding 3 storeys of less than 1 000 m2 floor
area in each storey. Single storey educational buildings All
buildings not exceeding two storeys to which the public are
admitted and which contain floor areas not exceeding 2 000
m2 at each storey.
2b Upper
Risk Group
(CC2b)
Hotels, flats, apartments and other residential buildings
greater than 4 storeys but not exceeding 15 storeys. Educa-
tional buildings greater than single storey but not exceeding
15 storeys. Retailing premises greater than 3 storeys but
not exceeding 15 storeys. Hospitals not exceeding 3 storeys.
Offices greater than 4 storeys but not exceeding 15 storeys.
All buildings to which the public are admitted and which
contain floor areas exceeding 2 000 m2 but not exceeding 5
000 m2 at each storey. Car parking not exceeding 6 storeys.
3 (CC3) All buildings defined above as Class 2 Lower and Upper
Consequences Class that exceed the limits on area and num-
ber of storeys. All buildings to which members of the public
are admitted in significant numbers. Stadia accommodat-
ing more than 5 000 spectators. Buildings containing haz-
ardous substances and /or processes
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Table 2: Comparison between the Importance classes for buildings reported in Eurocode 8 for
seismic design [11] and the Consequence classes reported in Eurocode 0 as base of design
[9].
Importance
class
Consequence
class
Building
I CC1 Buildings of minor importance for pub-
lic safety, e.g., agricultural buildings,
etc.
II CC2a Ordinary buildings, not belonging in
the other categories.
III CC2b Buildings whose seismic resistance is of
importance in view of the consequences
associated with a collapse, e.g., schools,
assembly halls, cultural institutions etc.
IV CC3 Buildings whose integrity during earth-
quakes is of vital importance for civil
protection, e.g., hospitals, fire stations,
power plants, etc.
Table 3: Indicative design working life, from [9].
Indicative de-
sign working life
(years)
Examples of the structures
10 Temporary structures
10 to 25 Replaceable structural parts,
e.g., gantry girders, bearings
15 to 30 Agricultural and similar struc-
tures
50 Building structures and other
common structures
100 Monumental building structures,
bridges, and other civil engineer-
ing structures
Table 4: Coefficient of importance in snow avalanche design, derived from Italian seismic design
code [18, Sec. 2.4.3].
Consequence class CI
CC1 0.7
CC2a 1.0
CC2b 1.5
CC3 2.0
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Table 5: Return periods, in years, for 3 consecutive days snow depth value, H72, suggested for
snow avalanche design for various limit states for design working life equal to 30 and 50
years. The probability of exceedance related to Operativity Limit State (OLS) is 50% in
the reference life. The same value is 20% in Damage Limit State (DLS), 10% in Ultimate
Limit State (ULS) and 2% in Collapse Limit State (CLS).
LD = 30 yr
Consequence
Class OLS DLS ULS CLS
CC1 20 60 126 656
CC2a 28 45 180 938
CC2b 41 128 270 106
CC3 55 170 360 1875
LD = 50 yr
Consequence
Class OLS DLS ULS CLS
CC1 32 99 210 1094
CC2a 46 142 300 1562
CC2b 69 213 450 2343
CC3 92 283 599 3124
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